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disobeying an ideal that they are "morally obliged to obey" (188). Eberle
explicitly recognizes that Audi's restraint principle is a prima facie one
(56), and he ecumenically makes his proposed right for religious citizens
to go against it a prima facie one: even though they have the moral (and,
of course, legal) right to reject the restraint principle, they "ought to be
extremely reluctant to impose coercive laws on their compatriots" (188).
Well, a reader can be excused for wondering if what we have here
is mainly a difference in emphasis. I suspect that if Audi, Eberle, and
Weithman (and the spirit of Rawls) could discuss a suitably nuanced approach to levels of moral responsibility, they might find some convergence
in the debate over debates in the public square.
NOTES
1. "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 154.
2. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1993),50.
3. Audi's view is summed up in Religious Commitment and Secular Reasoll
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Reviewed in this journal by
Francis Beckwith, January 2002 (19/1).
4. Because one can be a fallibilist about one's politics without being a fallibilist about one's deepest religious commitments (l03-there must be a "not"
missing in the fourth line from the bottom).

Democracy and Tradition, by Jeffrey Stout. Princeton University Press, 2004.
Pp. xvi + 348. $35.00 (cloth).
PAUL WEITHMAN, University of Notre Dame
Pessimists about democracy worry that contemporary democracies cannot foster the qualities their citizens must have if these societies are to
remain democratic.! This is a worry most commonly voiced by American
neo-conservatives. It is very different from two charges leveled at democracy by other thinkers who are also sometimes called "conservative" but
whom Jeffrey Stout more aptly labels "neo-traditionalists": the charge that
democracies are not societies in which the good life can be led, and the
stronger charge that the social forces at work in democracies make their
citizens bad people. 2
In this highly intelligent and challenging book, Stout directs a forceful combination of arguments against neo-traditionalist criticisms of
democracy. The concluding pages of the book suggest that Stout thinks
those arguments also provide him the material he needs to address the
neo-conservative worry (307-08; see also 12). Democracy and Tradition is
therefore not only an intelligent and challenging book, but a very ambitious one as well. It is a book in which Stout tries to layout grounds for
the hope he places in democracy, and to hold those grounds against the
doubts and objections of a wide range of thinkers. Indeed, showing that
hope in democracy is-to paraphrase Kant's remarks about reasonable
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faith-a "reasonable hope" for us to have (306) is one of the central aims,
if not the central aim, of Stout's book (see 57f£., 91).1

What is it to hope in democracy? Why is it important to ground that
hope?
"Democratic hope," Stout insists, is not the hope that democracy will
bring us redemption or save our souls (d. 40). It is merely "the hope of
making a difference for the better by democratic means" (58). Stout wants
to provide his readers, especially those attracted to religious versions
of neo-traditionalism, with enough reasons for such hope that they will
"identify with the democratic process" (75). Put somewhat differently:
Stout wants to convince his readers that they should think of themselves
as members of a large and heterogeneous national community which is
committed to living democratically. He especially wants to convince religious readers drawn to neo-traditionalism that they should think of themselves this way rather than as "resident aliens" in a society from which
they are distanced by their faith. 4
This aim is well chosen for, as I shall note again below, hope in and commitment to democracy may need some shoring up in societies that are all
too tempted to trade off liberty for security. Moreover, democracy-Stout
thinks-faces grave threats from the increasing concentration of wealth
and power in the hands of elites and corporations. Countering the more
virulent strains of neo-traditionalism among American citizens of faith,
and contributing to the revival of an American religious left are laudable
goals. If Stout has in fact done all that he sets out to do in this book, then
he will have accomplished a very great deal.
Stout's attempt is wide-ranging and nuanced. It shows a deft and subtle command of very difficult philosophical material. I cannot begin to
do the book justice in a brief review. Fortunately for readers of Stout's
book, Democracy and Tradition has already received a great deal of critical
attention. It has been the subject of at least one full-length conference. 5
Those who want detailed treatments of Stout's arguments should be able
to find them quite easily. My own discussion of the book is more modest. I begin by asking whether Stout can consistently both dispel the neoconservative worry about democracy and rebut neo-traditionalist critiques
of it. Pressing this question raises the further questions of whether Stout
has confronted the reasons for neo-traditionalism's appeal and whether he
has provided those attracted to neo-traditionalist critiques with reasons to
"identify with democratic processes."
Stout discusses three neo-traditionalists in some detail: Alasdair
MacIntyre, John Milbank, and Stanley Hauerwas. He singles out these
three because of their influence, particularly their influence "in the seminaries, divinity schools, and church-affiliated colleges of the wealthier democracies" (75). It is there that neo-traditionalist critiques of democracy
reach church-workers and clergy. They, in turn, spread these critiques "in
countless sermons throughout the heartland of the nation" (76). Thus it is
because neo-traditionalist critiques of democracy ultimately reach - and
threaten to win over-so large an audience that Stout is concerned to answer them. What is Stout's answer and how does he defend it?
The weaker of the two neo-traditionalist charges against democracy
is the charge that democracies are not societies in which the good life

BOOK REVIEWS

223

can be lived. The argument for that charge, I believe, depends upon the
claims that:
(1) A society is one in which the good life can be lived only if it is a
society whose members engage in collective public reflection about
the good life.
and
(2) Liberal democracies occlude such reflection.
Though neither Stout nor the neo-traditionalists' layout the argument
for the weak neo-traditionalist criticism in just this way, the imputation of
the argument to neo-traditionalists has some textual support. MacIntyre,
who seems to endorse the weak neo-traditionalist criticism of democracy,
argues for (1) in After Virtue. 6 He argues for (2) in, among other places,
his essay "The Privatization of Good."7 One way to answer the argument
would, of course, be to show that (1) is false. Stout takes a different tack. He
chooses, in effect, to rebut the argument by granting (1) but contesting (2).
Note that (2), as phrased, might seem to express a generalization about
liberal democracies that is only contingently true. Read this way, (2) is not
strong enough to support the weak traditionalist criticism of democracy,
which is a claim about the nature of democracy. The neo-traditionalist
thinks that democracies as such are not societies in which the good life can
be led. But to take (2) as the expression of a contingent fact is to misunderstand the neo-traditionalist. What the neo-traditionalist really means
by (2), I think, is that liberal democracies as such occlude collective public
reflection about the good life.
When the neo-traditionalist says that liberal democracies as sLlch occlude such reflection, she means to imply at least three further claims. She
means to imply, first, that insofar as societies faithfully embody the theory
of liberal democracy, they occlude such reflection; second, that societies
occlude such reflection because they embody that theory faithfully; and
third, that in the ideal liberal democracies envisioned by theorists of liberal democracy, there will be no such collective public reflection precisely
because they are ideal liberal democracies. Understood as a claim about
liberal democracies as such - and as a claim with these three further implications-(2) does indeed support the weak neo-traditionalist criticism
of liberal democracy as such. This is how Stout takes (2), and it is this construal of (2) that he tries to undercut.
Stout thinks that (2) derives much of its plausibility from neotraditionalists' equation of liberal democratic theory with the accounts of
liberal democracy provided by John Rawls and presupposed by Richard
Rorty. According to Rorty's account, religious and moral arguments about
the good life simply have no place in the public deliberations of a liberal
democracy. According to Rawls, arguments which appeal to comprehensive accounts of the human good need to be made good by what Rawls
calls "public reasons," at least when the most important issues are stake.
Rawls's requirement has the implication that claims about the human
good may not have reason-giving force in public debate. Thus both his
account of liberal democracy and Rorty's arguably do occlude collective
public reflection on the good life. In a very interesting and careful chapter,
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Stout tries to rob (2) of its plausibility by arguing that neither Rawls nor
Rorty has an adequate account of liberal democracy.
But Stout wants to do far more than undercut the argument for the
weak neo-traditionalist criticism. He wants to provide his readers reasons to commit to liberal democracy. To do so, I believe that he would
like to provide them reasons for thinking-contrary to the claims of neotraditionalists-that democratic societies are societies in which human beings can lead good lives. In pursuit of that end, Stout tries to recover an
account of democracy that is deeply indebted to Dewey and to contemporary Hegelianism. Stout's discussion of Hegelianism, in particular, is
accessible and sophisticated. For my purposes, it suffices simply to sketch
the most important features of the "alternative public philosophy" (296)
that Stout tries to portray in detail.
According to Stout, democracy is not in the first instance either a method of governance or a form of sovereignty. It is a culture (195). Stout follows Whitman in thinking of a culture as
an enduring collection of social practices, embedded in institutions
of a characteristic kind, reflected in specific habits and inhlitions, and
capable of giving rise to recognizable forms of human character. (28)
A society is presumably democratic, in Stout's view, when a democratic
culture prevails there. Its mode of governance is democratic when that
culture is "embedded in [political] institutions of a characteristic kind."
Not every culture is democratic. Democracy, in Stout's view, is distinguished from other cultures by the social practices of which it consists
and by the way those practices are conducted. Stout is quite clear about
what those practices are. "The social practices that matter most directly to
democracy," he writes are the discursive practices of ethical deliberation
and political debate" (293). Of course, as Stout recognizes, the mere presence of these practices does not itself make a culture democratic. Deliberation and debate take place in virtually every culture. A culture is democratic, Stout thinks, when citizens' deliberation and debate prominently
includes holding one another accountable and demanding reasons from
one another "for commitments, deeds and institutional arrangementswithout regard to social status, wealth or power" (226).8
Stout has no illusions about the inadequacies of contemporary societies
that purport to be democratic, but he is optimistic about what deliberation and debate in a democratic society can be. He thinks public debate
in democratic societies can and should include explicit moral reflection
that is deep and productive. Stout thinks this in part because he thinks
that in the processes of holding one another accountable and of exchanging reasons in good faith, citizens will make explicit the norms on which
they rely. He also thinks it because he thinks democratic societies can and
should debate "the important question of character" that Whitman posed
in Democratic Vistas-the question, as Stout puts it, of "what sort of people
we can reasonably aspire to be" (p. 19). Stout insists that this is a question
about what virtues we can aspire to and what virtues we can reasonably
expect to acquire (29). And he thinks it is a question about which citizens
of a democratic society can have meaningful public exchanges.
/J
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As I indicated earlier, Stout's treatment of Rawls and Rorty is meant
to undercut the reasons neo-traditionalists have for accepting (2). In light
of what Stout says about the subject matter of public deliberation in a democracy as he conceives it, I believe he would maintain that he has not
just undercut the argument that was supposed to support (2). He would
also say he has shown that (2) is false. And so he thinks he has shown that
democratic societies can be societies in which, as (1) says, "members engage in collective public reflection about the good life."
One problem with Stout's argument is that it is not clear exactly why he
thinks public discussion of "the question of character" can be meaningful
and productive, rather than superficial and shrill. A more serious problem
is that even showing that it can be will not be enough to convince neotraditionalists and their followers that the weak neo-traditionalist criticism of democracy is mistaken. That is, it will not be enough to convince
those drawn to neo-traditionalism that democracies are societies in which
the good life can be led. It will not be enough because (1) states a necessary
but not a sufficient condition on such societies. It states one condition that
neo-traditionalists think a society must meet if the good life can be led in
it. But it does not state all the conditions they think it must meet.
Suppose that in addition to (1), neo-traditionalists also accept:
(1') A society is one in which the good life can be lived only if it is a
society whose members agree on a conception of the good life.
Stout has not shown that the deliberation and debate characteristic of democracy as he conceives it will lead to any such consensus. Indeed, he
says it would be a "grave mistake" to think that a "nation like ours" can
be "bound together by agreement on its highest values, a religious vision
of the good, or a big story about the origins and destiny of a people" (303).
So Stout seems to doubt that democracies as he thinks of them will satisfy the condition imposed by (1'). Since this is a condition many neotraditionalists arguably do impose, Stout needs to do more to convince
them that their weak criticism of democracy is misplaced.
Of course, (1') strikes many of us as highly implausible; for those who
find it so, neo-traditionalism has little appeal. The question of whether
those of us who are not neo-traditionalists should think we can lead the
good life in the democratic society Stout envisions is an interesting one.
Instead of pursuing it, I want to turn to the neo-conservative worry about
democracy that Stout tries to address in the closing pages of his book.
The neo-conservative worry is that democratic societies may not be able to
foster the traits of character their citizens must have if those societies are
to remain democratic. What are those traits? Neo-conservatives typically
cite a traditional list of virtues including piety, self-restraint and frugality.
I would like to ask about some other traits instead.
Consider the possibility that in the face of standing terrorist threats,
the democracies of the West will gradually become "National Security
States." Suppose, that is, that in the name of national security, they become societies in which the governmental surveillance of private citizens
is increased, in which civil liberties, privacy rights and freedom of movement are gradually restricted, in which an increasingly large portion of
government revenues are spent on the security apparatus and on military
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adventures, and in which legislative and judicial authorities cease to serve
as checks on the executive because the public demands that those authorities uncritically acquiesce in the executive's national security and military
initiatives. Such a society might not have ceased to be a democracy altogether, but it would be one in which what we ordinarily think of as liberal
democracy is significantly eroded. The possibility of such a transformation certainly seems to be a live one.
What qualities of character must citizens have if they are to prevent
their society from devolving into a National Security State? I suggest that
they must regard themselves and their fellow citizens as the bearers of
very strong civil, political, and privacy rights. Only if they have such a
sense of themselves and others, I suggest, will they be prepared steadfastly to resist encroachments on their liberties when they are tempted by
a state apparatus that offers them protection in exchange for lesser associational and political freedomY
Can democracy as Stout conceives it encourage this important trait in
citizens, this sense of themselves as rights-bearers? Here Stout seems to
face a dilemma. For suppose that his answer is "no." Then Stout will not
be able adequately to address the neo-conservative worry about democracy. He will not be able to maintain that democracy as he conceives it can
foster a trait citizens must have if they are to maintain their democracy
against the temptations of a National Security State. If, on the other hand,
Stout claims that democracy as he conceives it does foster the trait, then
he will leave himself open to the strong neo-traditionalist criticism of democracy. According to that criticism, the social forces at work in liberal
democratic societies make their citizens bad people. One of the things that
some neo-traditionalists like Stanley Hauerwas find most objectionable
about liberal democracies seems precisely to be that they encourage their
citizens to think of themselves as bearers of rights. lO
Stout may reply that what neo-traditionalists find objectionable about
liberal democratic culture is not just that it encourages citizens to think of
themselves as rights-bearers. It is that citizens who think of themselves
in this way tend also to be selfish or self-centered individualists. Stout's
own version of democracy, he may remind us, is a solidaristic enterprise.
It is "likely to thrive only where individuals identify to some significant
extent with a community of reason-givers" (293). If a society demands
and reinforces this communal identification, Stout may claim, then it can
encourage its citizens to think of themselves as bearers of rights without
fostering the individualism neo-traditionalists deplore. Thus, Stout may
say, his version of democracy can go some way in responding to the neoconservative worry - by fostering the trait I have said citizens need to preserve democracy-while evading the strong neo-traditionalist criticismY
But I wonder whether many of those attracted by neo-traditionalism
would be satisfied with this response.
I suspect that when neo-traditionalist critiques of democracy are
preached from pulpits or taught in seminaries, they do not fall on fertile
ground simply because congregants and students are disturbed by the
culture and the character-types for which they are told liberal democracy
is responsible. Those critiques take root, bear fruit and spread because
those who hear them think American democracy has reached the wrong
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political outcomes-prohibiting prayer in public schools, mandating the
teaching of evolution, permitting abortion, legalizing assisted suicide in
some jurisdictions and enacting domestic partnership statutes in others. In
short, I suspect that-whatever wide-ranging cultural critiques its proponents may offer-the popular appeal of neo-traditionalism depends upon
the beliefs that democratic processes are legitimated by their outcomes,
and that the outcomes those processes have yielded are morally suspect.
Of course not everyone who disapproves of some or all of the outcomes
I just listed will accept neo-traditionalism tout court when it is taught or
preached to them. Some, ambivalent toward their society anyway because
it has reached these outcomes, may find that neo-traditionalism expresses
or crystallizes some of their attitudes toward it. These citizens may hold
on to what Stout calls "democratic hope." They may demonstrate their
hope by continuing to vote in large numbers. That they may do so suggests that they are not ambivalent about central features of democratic
governance, such as campaigns and elections. They are, however, ambivalent about identifying with the larger "community of reason-givers." Their
identification with that community may be conditional on its reaching the
outcomes they prefer. If the community shows no sign of moving toward
those outcomes, then these citizens may be increasingly disaffected from
democracy. In that case, they may find that neo-traditionalism provides a
compelling vocabulary in which to express their disaffection.
If this is so, then many of those Stout wants to win over to his version
of democracy will be convinced only if he can argue persuasively that
democracy as he conceives it will reach those outcomes. Stout offers no
such argument. Indeed, he says very little about what he thinks the outcome of "ethical deliberation and political debate" in a democratic society
is likely to be or about what principles of political morality constrain the
outcomes. I therefore think it unlikely that he will persuade many of those
attracted by neo-traditionalist critiques of democracy that those critiques
are fundamentally unsound.
The problem Stout faces in winning over those drawn to neotraditionalism is not just that he does not say enough about what the
outcomes of political and ethical reflection are likely to be or about what
moral and political principles constrain it. It is that, given Stout's perfectionism, it is not clear what more he could say. Elucidating his Emersonian
perfectionism, Stout writes:
Emerson and Whitman are committed to an ethics of virtue or selfcultivation that is always in the process of projecting a higher conception of self to be achieved and leaving one's achieved self (but
not its accumulated responsibilities) behind. The force of "always"
here is to cancel the fixed tel os of perfection toward which earlier
perfectionisms directed their ethical striving. The Emersonian self is
constantly being reshaped. (29)
It is surely an open question whether this form of perfectionism-with its
rejection of a "fixed telos" -will be of wide appeal. Whether or not it will
be depends upon just what a "fixed telos" is supposed to be, what the rejection of it comes to and what personal and associationalliberties contin-
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uous self-transformation demands. More to the present point, it is hard to
see how Stout could know in advance of actual political deliberation what
the outcome of debate would be when the debate includes citizens who
are constantly reshaping themselves. If he cannot, then it seems doubtful
that he can provide assurance to those whose commitment to democracy
is at least to some extent conditional on the outcomes it reaches.
Stout's own hope for democracy seems ultimately to rest on the faith
he has in the goodness of his fellow citizens. Perhaps he would respond
that those drawn to neo-traditionalism should have faith that their fellow
citizens are good enough to reach the right outcomes when they engage in
democratic practices. 12 Or perhaps he would respond that those drawn to
neo-traditionalism should attach far less importance to reaching the political outcomes they favor and simply cast their lot with their compatriots.
The problem is that both of these replies seem to depend upon a mutual
trust that is currently lacking or at least severely strained. It is not clear
what grounds Stout can provide those drawn to neo-traditionalism for
placing as much faith in others as he does.13
Defenders of democracy face a formidable challenge. That is the challenge of convincing citizens who believe they will lose on what they regard as the most important issues that they should remain firmly identified with those who continue to defeat them and that they should remain
steadfastly committed to the democratic processes by which that defeat is
handed to them. In Stout's terms, it is the challenge of instilling "the hope
of making a difference for the better by democratic means" in those who
think that, on the issues that matter most, things are getting worse. The
challenge may be insurmountable, at least under current conditions. It is a
credit to this splendid book that its author has identified that challenge so
clearly and made so fine an attempt to meet it.
NOTES
1. I received helpful comments on earlier drafts from Jennifer Herdt, Jean
Porter, and Jeff Stout.
2. Stout puts the stronger criticism somewhat less baldly. "Do we have
reason to be happy with the kind of people we have become under the influence of modern ideas, practices and institutions? The traditionalist answer to
this question, of course, is no" (118).
3. Note that Rawls has a similar aim. He says the task of political philosophy is the vindication of reasonable faith-"reasonable faith," he says, "in the
real possibility of a just constitutional regime." See 'The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus" in John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Freeman (Harvard University Press, 1999) 420-48, 448.
4. The phrase "resident aliens" is Stanley Hauerwas's.
5. The conference was held at the University of Tennessee in October of
2004. For some background information on the conference, see: http://web
.utk.edu/-religion/symposium/background.htm
6. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press,
1981).
7. Alasdair MacIntyre, "The Privatization of Good", Review of Politics 52
(1990): 320-48.
8. I am not sure even this is enough to make a culture democratic, but let
that pass.
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9. At 291f£., Stout discusses "three 'formidable constituencies' that are
currently contending for control of the American state." He remarks that
"[d]emocracy will face unpromising odds at the national level so long as the
three entrenched constituencies jointly control the political landscape" (292).
I would add that the state itself is a formidable political actor which can pose
its own distinctive threat to democracy.
10. See, for example, the interview with Hauerwas posted at: http://www
.beliefnet.com/storyI146/story_14666_1.html.
Speaking of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the interviewer said to Hauerwas "But his
beef with liberal democracy seems more philosophical and thoroughgoing.
He says that the language of rights and liberties, as you write in your book,
'cannot help but lead to godlessness and the subsequent deification of man,
which is the proclamation of nihilism.'" Hauerwas replied "That's right, and
in noting that, I hoped some people would see a parallel to the present day in
this country."
11. See 289, where Stout says "Assuming, as I do, that democratic individuality is a good thing, not to be confused with atomistic dissolution of
social life."
12. See 308: "we should not imagine the life-giving sources on which we
depend as something alien to American democratic modernity. That stream is
in us and of us when we engage in our democratic practices."
13. Stout seems to treat his faith in his fellow citizens as basic. It seems to be
on the basis of such faith that he puts his hope in democracy. In moving from
faith in his fellow citizens to faith in democracy, Stout reverses what I believe
to be the more plausible order of argument followed by Rawls. Rawls argues
first (and at very great length) that it is possible for human beings to sustain a
just liberal democracy. He then argues from this conclusion to the conclusion
that human beings have a moral nature; see Political Liberalism, lxi-Ixii.
Clearly Rawls can proceed as he does because he has substantive standards
of justice available to him: he takes a liberal democracy to be just only if its political outcomes are constrained by reasonable principles of justice. Since Stout
does not endorse principles of justice or any other criteria for just political outcomes, he is not in a position to say much about what a just liberal democracy
would be like. If he cannot say what a just liberal democracy would be like,
then it is hard to see how he can argue that it is possible for people to sustain
a just liberal democracy except by appeal to faith in his fellow citizens. In that
case, the Rawlsian order of argument may not be open to him.

Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy, by Patrick R. Frierson.
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. x + 211 pages. $55.00 (hardback).
HEINER BIELEFELDT, Director of the German Institute for Human Rights,
Berlin
Patrick Frierson's book fits into a series of recent Kant publications devoted to challenging the stereotype that Kantian philosophy is a purely
abstract enterprise, largely disconnected from human experience. The
most famous formulation of that stereotype, which itself was already
brought up by some of Kant's contemporaries, is Hegel's allegation that
the Kantian moral law remains "something empty which can never become reality." However, like Onora O'Neill, Allan Wood, Paul Guyer, and

